Abstract-A new method to derive Multivariate Quadratic equation systems (MQ) for the input and output bit variables of a cryptographic S-box from its algebraic expressions with the aid of the computer mathematics software system SageMath is presented. We consolidate the deficiency of previously presented MQ metrics, supposed to quantify the resistance of Sboxes against algebraic attacks.
I. Overview
We present a new automated way to produce and investigate Multivariate Quadratic equation systems (MQ) over GF (2) for the Rijndael S-box (S RD ) and alikes. In the next we first shortly survey the principles of S RD in section II. Recently, Jie Cui et al. [1] claimed to have presented a new and concise approach for generating such MQ for S RD and also to have proposed a cryptographically more secure S-box. In section III we depict the derivation of Cui et al. In section IV we present our automated way to produce the MQ for S RD aided by the computer mathematics software system SageMath [2] . As we demonstrate later, this method can be applied for other proposed S-boxes, alleged to be cryptographically stronger. We also generate the Gröbner bases describing the two different S-boxes and calculate solutions of all equation systems with the help of a SAT solver. In section V we investigate, critically discuss, and dismiss equation-metrics-based criteria as inappropriate to estimate the resistance against algebraic attacks (RAA) of an S-box. In sections VI and VII we build MQ for the S-box proposed by Jie Cui et al. [1] and show why this is not an improvement. The complicated algebraic expression for the S-box constructed by Cui et al. leads to a great number of equations and independent monomials in the resulting MQ. On the basis of the RAA formulas the new S-box should demonstrate a remarkable robustness against algebraic attacks. But from that same S-box can be derived a much simpler MQ leading to a polynomial system nearly as easy solvable as that of the original S RD . This is what we do in section VII greatly facilitated by SageMath.
Our main contribution is the demonstration of the handiness which Sagemath offers to the researcher so that he can derive his MQ and its metrics in a fast way and transparently verify the quality of existing formulas supposed to quantify resistance of the MQ to algebraic attacks. In conclusion, we couldn't validate the predicted reduced hardness for a system to solve with increasing number of equations and number of independent monomials in the polynomial systems according to suggested RAA formulas.
II. Principle of Rijndael S-box RD
We shortly repeat its well known principles and algebraic properties [3] . Looking upon 8-bit bytes as elements in GF (2 8 ), Rijndael's S-box is a mapping S : GF (2 8 ) −→ GF (2 8 ) in form of a combination of an inverse function I(x) which is a multivariate inverse modulo the irreducible polynomial m(t) = t 8 +t 4 +t 3 +t+1 and an affine transformation function A(x). x is a byte variable consisting of bits x i (i = 0, . . . , 7) , with x 7 symbolizing the most significant bit: x = 7 i=0 x i t i . The modular inverse function I(x) is defined as:
i.e., the modular inverse of 0 is mapped to 0. According to the AES design [4] , [5] , the affine transformation A(x) can also be described as a modular polynomial multiplication followed by an addition (XOR) of a constant polynomial:
with a = '1F' and b = '63' . A two-digit hexadecimal number stands for a constant byte, that is a polynomial in t, e.g, '63' for t 6 + t 5 + t + 1. The Rijndael S-box can be written as:
III. Rijndael S-box explored by Cui et al. Cui et al. [1] (as Courtois and Pieprzyk [3] before them) utilize the Rijndael S-box composition (3) to derive an MQ for it. With x the input and z the output value, and the 978-1-5090-5569-2/17/$31.00 c 2017 IEEE A(I(x) ). Considering the inverse transformation y = I(x), obviously xy = 1 when x not equal 0, which reads in polynomial form:
The above modulo division is then analytically performed and a comparison of coefficients of terms of the same order in t k , 0 ≤ k ≤ 7, leads to the first eight multivariate quadratic equations for Rijndael S-box on the pages 2483, 2484 of the paper of Cui et al. [1] The authors give all the steps and in-between results of the complete length of the calculation. They formulate and evaluate two additional equations of the byte variables to define the S-box completely. Doing so, Cui et al. replicate results already presented in 2002 by Courtois and Pieprzyk in the extended version of [3] .
IV. Rijndael S-box coded in Sage SageMath or briefly Sage (System for Algebra and Geometry Experimentation) is a free open-source software system for computer mathematics [6] . It is licensed under the Gnu General Public License. It builds on top of many existing computer mathematics open-source packages. Their combined power is accessible through a common, Python-based language interface from the command line or a web browser. Originally, it is designed by William Stein, still the leader of the SageMath project, and also inventor of SageMathCloud [7] for collaborative computational mathematics.
In order to work with polynomials like x = 7 i=0 x i t i , Sage provides modules to construct rings of multivariate polynomials. The polynomials x, y, and z introduced in the previous section we model in Sage as follows. 1 In line 1 of listing 1 a variable for the number of bits is defined for convenience. In line 2 a list of strings for the names of the coefficients of the three byte polynomials is generated (['x0', 'x1', .., 'z7']). In line 3 a Boolean polynomial ring for these coefficients is constructed which assigns GF (2) properties to them. In line 4 the coefficient names are made available as variables. In line 5 a polynomial ring over the Boolean polynomial 1 The complete code presented here together with its output is accessible at SageMathCloud [8] .
ring B is constructed and from that, in line 6, the final quotient ring Byte with modulus m(t). In lines 7 and 8, lists 2 of coefficient variables of the byte polynomials are created for convenience. With the help of these lists, in the last two lines the polynomials are modeled in two equivalent ways, x explicitly, and y by using the Byte constructor. Now one can already evaluate the product xy in Sage with the commands:
In the second line we used the list() attribute to get the coefficients of each power of t in expression E3. Due to the usage of the quotient ring, E3 is of degree 7, the length of list eqs3 (the number of coefficients) is 8. The terms we have gotten with Sage compare with the right-hand sides (rhs) of the system of equations with number (3) in the paper of Cui et al. [1] Cui et al. proceeded with the generation of the next set of equations for Rijndael's S-box, the affine transformation. From equation (2) setting z = A(y) it follows
since a 7 a mod(t 8 + 1) = 1. Substituting (5) for y in xy we get the final form of the first implicit eight equations representing Rijndael S-box. In Sage the values substitution is accomplished with the help of a so called dictionary. By using equation (5) the code in Listing 2 generates this dictionary, called eqs4. 
The first line sets up a quotient ring modulo t 8 + 1. The next four lines define the byte variable z and the two constant polynomials a and b in this ring (with generator u). The rhs of equation (5) simply reads a^7 * (z + b) in the code. The dictionary is constructed in the last line. The result is shown in Listing 3.
Listing 3. Dictionary to substitute y variables { y7 : z6 + z4 + z1 , y6 : z5 + z3 + z0 , y5: z7 + z4 + z2, y4 : z6 + z3 + z1 , y3: z5 + z2 + z0, y2: z7 + z4 + z1 + 1, y1 : z6 + z3 + z0 , y0: z7 + z5 + z2 + 1}
The substitution of y in equation eqs3 via the dictionary succeeds with the following:
The result is again a list, the members of which give the first set of eight multivariate quadratic equations of the Sbox by setting the byte variable product equal to 1. This list of terms eqs5 is identical to the system of equations (5) of Cui et al. Those equations with zero constant term (7 out of 8 above) are true with probability equal to 1. The 8th equation (the coefficient of t 0 ) is true only when x = 0, so that this equation is true with a probability 255/256. Furthermore for ∀ x = 0 x = x 2 y. Obviously this last equation is true also when x = 0, so that one can write:
. .
Cui et al. take the last of the above and write two symmetrical equations to generate an additional set of 16 equations for the Rijndael S-box. The equations they take are:
We develop the two last equations to get the needed additional 16 equations for the implicated variables. We also substitute in these equations y by using the dictionary in listing 3.
The result is a list of terms which are practically the equations (7) of Cui et al. written in the reverse order than that of Cui's paper. Cui et al. begin with the expression corresponding to the highest order term of E7 while the sage list begins with the constant term. These terms are identical with the rhs of equations (7) in Cui et al. [1] with a couple of minimal differences which we attribute to typographical errors in the paper of Cui et al. Similarly, we write:
and, by setting these terms equal to 0, get the next block of eight equations for the Rijndael S-box which are to be compared with the system (8) of Cui et al. Here we see a couple of discrepancies which we again attribute to typographical mistakes in the reference paper. Using the Sage model of this S-box it is easy to count the number of equations, the number of terms in each equation and determining the minimal and maximal number of terms, as well as the total number of different terms, as shown in Listing 4. 
As mentioned above, the first equation is discarded since it is only true with probability 255/256 (false if x = 0). This gives for the Rijndael S-box 23 equations, with between 28 and 49 monomials per equation and, in total, 81 different monomials.
Finding the 256 solutions of this equation system representing the value table of the byte S-box with a SAT solver in Sage is accomplished with the following two lines of code:
Listing 5. SAT solver usage from sage . sat . boolean_polynomials \ import solve as solve_sat % time r = solve_sat ( mq1 , n= infinity )
This takes ca. 0.6 s CPU time on a decent computer (2.8 GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM). As a point of reference we also evaluate the Gröbner basis (GB) of this MQ and print the number of the basis equations, as well as the maximal degree and the number of its monomials:
The evaluation of the Gröbner basis takes ca. 14 seconds, it has 8 equations of degree 7 with 263 different monomials. The solution of the basis equations with the SAT solver is about 4 times as fast as the solution of the MQ.
Courtois and Pieprzyk [3] state that these 23 equations are linearly independent. Nonetheless, the last 16 equations (7) only, i.e. mq2 = eqs7 + eqs8, are already sufficient to evaluate the Gröbner basis and to compute the S-box value table of 256 solutions with the SAT solver which takes ca. 0.7 s CPU time on the same computer. The 16 equations describing the Rijndael S-box have between 28 and 49 monomials per equation and, in total, 81 different monomials.
V. Algebraic attacks and S-box optimization
For quantifying the resistance against algebraic attacks for r equations in t terms over GF (2 n ) Cui et al. [1] have used the criterion of Cheon and Lee [9] which defines the Resistance against Algebraic Attacks (RAA) Γ as:
Courtois and Pieprzyk [3] use another criterion
(note the brackets in the exponent indicating the ceiling function). 3 The value of these criteria should reflect the difficulty of solving multivariate equations. For the To generate a harder to solve equation system Cui et al. [1] have introduced a more complicated Rijndael S-box structure which they name Affine-Inverse-Affine (AIA) structure. This S-box will be explored in detail in the next two sections.
VI. MQ of the AIA structure S-box in Sage In Cui, Huang, et al. (2011) [10] , a new Rijndael S-box structure named Affine-Inverse-Affine (AIA) is designed supposed to increase the algebraic complexity of said Sbox. Questioning this claim, we considered it worthwhile to try and check their calculations and assertions.
A different affine transformation (2) with a = '5B' and b = '5D' is chosen. This transformation is applied before and after the inversion step:
Cui et al. [1] derive a multivariate quadratic equation system of S AIA using the coefficients of the polynomial expression of the S-box. They write down the equation system with indices for rounds and input bytes for the AES algorithm (but never use them). The round indices will be omitted here as they don't matter in what follows. As before, by x is denoted the input byte variable of the S-box function. Intermediate variables are denoted by y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y 253 and the output variable by z. According to the polynomial expression of the new AIA S-box, the S-box transformation can be described by the following quadratic equations over GF (2 8 
(The coefficients of Cui et al. [1] as listed in their Table 1 which in turn corresponds to Table 3 in Cui, Huang, et al. [10] are wrong and don't represent the polynomial expression of their S-box S AIA , although, Cui, Huang, et al. list in their preceding In lines 3 and 4 lists of strings for the names of coefficients for the byte variables x, z, and y 0 , . . . , y 252 are generated.
Then, as in Listing 1, in line 5 a Boolean polynomial ring for these coefficients is constructed, assigning GF (2) properties to them, in line 6 the coefficients are made available as variables and in line 7 a polynomial ring over the Boolean polynomial ring B is constructed and from that in line 8, eventually, the quotient ring Byte with modulus m(t).
In lines 9 to 11 tuples of the coefficient variables of the byte polynomials are created for convenience. For the y-variables the coefficients are grouped byte-wise in sublists. In the last three lines, finally, the polynomials of the byte variables are defined using these tuples as arguments for the Byte constructor. For the y-variables a list of polynomials is used.
In the next Sage code block (Listing 8), the coefficients of the polynomial expression of S AIA are given in hexadecimal notation as a list of strings which is transformed to a list of the constant polynomials that enter g (11): In the last line of this code block each two-digit hexadecimal number in the table represented by a two character string is converted into a decimal number by the code fragment ZZ(_, 16). Appending .bits() transforms it into a list of 0s and 1s, a big-endian binary representation of the hexadecimal number. Applying the Byte constructor gives the corresponding constant polynomial.
With these preparations the equation system (10), (11) of the AIA S-box (equation 9 in Cui et al. [1] ) can be modeled in Sage as shown in Listing 9. In the last line the first term (the t 0 -coefficient of xy 0 + 1) is discarded since it is only true with probability 255/256 (false if x = 0). Using this Sage model we evaluate some metrics of this MQ as before. This gives for the new AIA S-box 2,039 equations, with between 3 and 1,034 monomials per equation. These equations have in total 18,232 different monomials. In order to apply the criteria of section V, the intermediate variables also were taken into account by interpreting the parameter n in the definitions (8) and (9) Also, the CPU time to evaluate all 256 solutions of this MQ with a SAT solver is ca. 7 s, which is 12 (≈ 2 4 ) times as long as for the original Rijndael S-box.
Cui et al. [1] count a totally different number of equations and terms based on the byte variables, not on their polynomial coefficients, which contradicts the scheme applied to the Rijndael S-box with which they compare, and therefore, is misleading.
Further, this method used by Cui et al. [1] to derive an MQ for their AIA S-box applies to any S-box using the coefficients of its polynomial expression. This illustrates that the resulting numbers of equations and terms are deceptive as criterion for the estimation of algebraic attack resistance and inapt to differentiate the quality of byte Sboxes. To substantiate this point, we have derived such an MQ for the original Rijndael S-box by using its polynomial expression in equation (10) . The function g then reads
The same Sage code (Listings 7, 8, and 9) was used with an adapted table of the polynomial expression coefficients in 5 Formal application of n = 8 yields unlikely high values: Γ ≈ 2 22,241 and Γ CP ≈ 2 100 . accordance with equation (12) . This MQ of the Rijndael Sbox exhibits the same number of equations with the same number of different monomials as the MQ of S AIA resulting in equally high, misleading Γ values. Also, the SAT solver needs the same 7 s CPU time to find the solutions of this MQ.
In contrast, we will show in the next section how to derive, aided by computer mathematics, a much simpler MQ for the AIA S-box which shows that its resistance against algebraic attacks according to the effort of a SAT solver not really exceeds that of the original Rijndael Sbox. But the RAA criteria exaggerate the hardness of that simpler MQ.
VII. Concise MQ for the AIA S-box in Sage
Building on the Sage code presented so far we derive a much simpler MQ for the AIA S-box. Its resistance against algebraic attacks according to the RAA criterion should be greater than that of the original Rijndael S-box but overestimates the time it takes to solve the system with a SAT solver.
For the inversion step we now use, temporarily, two intermediate byte variables The last two equations in (13) are the only other additional (fully quadratic) MQ (besides y 0 y 1 = 1) for the inversion as stated already by Courtois and Pieprzyk in the extended version of [3] (compare also Cheon and Lee [9] ). These additional equations are necessary to completely define the S-box S AIA . Without them the system is underdefined, as, for example, the solution with a SAT solver shows. In Sage the equations (13) The linear transformations according to equation (2) are
with a = '5B' (hence a 8 mod(t 8 + 1) = 1) and b = '5D' . In Sage we formulate Listing 10. Generate dictionary to substitute y variables Baff .<u > = P. quotient_ring (p^8 + 1) a = Baff ( ZZ ( '0 x5B '). bits ()) b = Baff ( ZZ ( '0 x5D '). bits ())
The right hand sides of equations (14) and (15) 
and gives already the final, concise MQ for the S-box S AIA : mq5 = eqs10 + eqs11 + eqs12 + eqs13
For this MQ counting the numbers of equations and monomials in Sage is done as before. It has 32 equations, with between 33 and 60 monomials per equation and 137 different monomials in total. This makes according to definitions (8) and (9) For comparison and as an additional reference value for the RAA estimation, we have derived such an MQ with 32 equations for the original Rijndael S-box using the four equations (13) (replacing y 0 by x and y 1 by y) and its affine transformation (5) (with a = '1F' , b = '63' ). This MQ has the same number of equations and the same number of different monomials, thus, the same values for the hardness criteria as that of S AIA . The solution with the SAT solver of this MQ for the original Rijndael S-box takes the same CPU time as the solution of the 32 equation MQ of S AIA , namely, ca. 0.8 s. This shows how Sage can easily be used to disprove the practicality of the hardness criteria.
VIII. Conclusion
SageMath is a very appropriate, powerful computer mathematics tool to analyze cryptographic problems formulated with byte variables as polynomials in a quotient ring. Sage draws its strength in this area mainly from the integration of the BRiAl, former PolyBoRi, library [2] , [12] .
We have used Sage to demonstrate how to produce various polynomial Multivariate Quadratic equation systems (MQ) as well as their Gröbner basis for the Rijndael S-box S RD and similar S-boxes in a simple and straightforward manner. Using the flexible structures and interface of Sage one can easily evaluate metrics of the resulting polynomial systems, like the number of different monomials in the system, the length of the equations, the frequency of the appearance of certain terms or variables in equations etc. With this facility we generated the necessary inputs for the application of estimations of the Resistance against Algebraic Attacks (RAA) proposed by Cui et al. [1] or by Courtois and Pieprzyk [3] . Parallelly, we performed numerical experiments by solving the corresponding MQ with a SAT solver using the required computing time as a measure for the RAA.
Our results in this respect are revealing. We couldn't validate the predicted reduced hardness for a system to solve with increasing number of equations and number of independent monomials in the polynomial systems which both the formulas forecast. There is in fact a slight increased solver effort when one reduces from the 23 Rijndael S-box equations to the 16 but quantitatively this is badly represented in both formulas.
Cui et al. constructed a complicated algebraic expression for a new Rijndael S-box S AIA (starting from its Lagrange polynomial expression with 255 coefficients) which necessarily leads to a great number of equations and independent monomials in the resulting MQ. On this basis they thought they have demonstrated a remarkable new S-box practically not possible to solve according to the here discussed and by us dismissed RAA formulas. However there are gaps in their concept arising from inconsistency in their comparison principle as well as the lack of thoroughness in the investigation of the properties of the new algebraic expression which we showed can be equivalently written in a much simpler form leading to a polynomial system nearly as easy solved as that of the original Rijndael S-box.
We also mapped the original Rijndael S-box with its 9 Lagrange coefficients on the AIA form of Cui et al. which gave us as result the same huge number of variables and multitude of polynomials which should manifest that this is no way to create especially hard cryptographic S-boxes.
We presented how to show with SageMath that the, by Cui et al. so called, improved S-box S AIA is in fact not even marginally an improvement. algebraic attack resistance estimations scrutinized in this work.
